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Abstract
The Aumann-Shapley (1974) value, originating in cooperative game
theory, is used for the allocation of risk capital to portfolios of pooled
liabilities, as proposed by Denault (2001). We obtain an explicit for-
mula for the Aumann-Shapley value, when the risk measure is given
by a distortion premium principle (Wang et al., 1997). The capital
allocated to each instrument or (sub)portfolio is given as its expected
value under a change of probability measure. Motivated by Mirman
and Tauman (1982), we discuss the role of Aumann-Shapley prices in
an equilibrium context and present a simple numerical example.
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1 Introduction
We discuss the problem of allocating aggregate capital requirements for a
portfolio of pooled liabilities to the instruments that the portfolio consists
of. Cooperative game theory (Shapley (1953), Aumann and Shapley (1974),
Aubin (1981)) provides a suitable framework for cost allocation problems
(e.g. Lemaire 1984). Typically, provisions are made so that the allocation of
total costs does not produce disincentives for cooperation to any player (in-
strument) in the game or coalition of players (sub-portfolio of instruments).
A closely related approach has been to determine an allocation scheme by
imposing economically motivated axioms on the system of prices that it
would produce (Billera and Heath (1982), Mirman and Tauman (1982)).
The solution concept that emerges from the latter approaches is the cele-
brated Aumann-Shapley (1974) value. In the context of capital allocation,
cooperation can be understood as the pooling of risky portfolios, and the cost
as the ‘risk capital’ that a regulator decides that the holder of the portfolios
should carry. This case was discussed in depth by Denault (2001), who used
a cost functional based on a coherent risk measure (Artzner et al., 1999),
and the Aumann-Shapley value emerged again as an appropriate solution
concept. Explicit calculations of the Aumann-Shapley value were provided
when the risk measure used is Expected Shortfall (this problem was solved
by Tasche (2000a) in the context of performance measurement) and for the
case of a risk measure used by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In this paper we calculate an analytic formula for the Aumann-Shapley
value using quantile derivatives (Tasche 2000b), for the case that the risk
measure belongs to the class of distortion principles (Denneberg (1990),
Wang et al. (1997)). We obtain a representation of the Aumann-Shapley
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value, i.e. the capital allocated to each portfolio, as the expected value of
the portfolio under a change of probability measure. This representation
creates a formal link between problems of allocating capital and pricing
risks. We discuss this relationship through the example of a pool, which
covers specific liabilities carried by a number of insurers, who in turn make
cash contributions to the pool, that can be interpreted as risk premia.
It was shown by Mirman and Tauman (1982) that the Aumann-Shapley
value yields equilibrium prices in a monopolistic production economy. Mo-
tivated by this work, we generalise the example to a case where the different
insurers choose the extent of coverage received from the pool, by expected
utility maximization. This set-up is quite different from the equilibrium
models usually found in the literature on risk sharing, for example Borch
(1962), Bu¨hlmann (1980), Taylor (1995), Aase (2002). In these papers, mar-
ket prices are obtained via a clearing condition, which is not applicable to the
problem that we discuss. Finally, we provide a simple numerical example,
where the pool offers stop-loss protection to the participating insurers.
2 Coherent risk measures and distortion princi-
ples
A coherent risk measure is defined by Artzner et al. (1999) as a functional
ρ(X) on a collection of random cashflows (in our case X will be a non-
negative random variable representing liabilities) that satisfies the following
properties:
Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y a.s. then ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y )
Subadditivity: ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y )
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Positive Homogeneity: If a ∈ R+ then ρ(aX) = aρ(X)
Translation Invariance: If a ∈ R then ρ(X + a) = ρ(X) + a
ρ(X) is interpreted as “the minimum extra cash that the agent has to
add to the risky position X, and to invest ‘prudently’, to be allowed to
proceed with his plans” (Artzner et al., 1999). ‘Invest prudently’, in this
paper, means with zero interest.
All functionals satisfying the above properties allow a representation:
ρ(X) = sup
P∈P
EP[X] (1)
where P is a collection of probability measures.
Two random variables X, Y are called comonotonic if there is a random
variable U and non-decreasing functions g, h such that X = g(U), Y = h(U)
(Denneberg, 1994a). Comonotonicity corresponds to the strongest form
of positive dependence between random variables. An additional desirable
property of risk measures is additivity for comonotonic risks:
Comonotonic Additivity: If X, Y comonotonic then ρ(X+Y ) = ρ(X)+ρ(Y )
It can be shown that, if and only if ρ(X) is a coherent risk measure sat-
isfying comonotonic additivity, it has a representation as a Choquet integral
with respect to a submodular set function or capacity, v (Choquet (1953),
Denneberg (1994a), Delbaen (2000)):
ρ(X) =
∫
Xdv =
∫
∞
0
v(X > t)dt, (2)
where v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≤ v(A) + v(B).
Let P0 be the physical (actuarial) probability measure. If g : [0, 1] 7→
[0, 1] is a continuous, increasing and concave function, with g(0) = 0 and
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g(1) = 1, then v(A) = g(P0(A)) is a submodular set function (Denneberg,
1994a). Thus the following integral is a comonotonic additive coherent risk
measure:
ρ(X) =
∫
∞
0
g(P0(X > t))dt, (3)
The risk measures used in this paper will be of the above form. This type
of risk measures have been axiomatically defined in the context of insur-
ance pricing by Denneberg (1990) and Wang et al. (1997). They are
termed distortion principles, since the non-linear function g ‘distorts’ the
physical probability measure P0. Choquet integrals have also found appli-
cation as non-linear pricing functionals in financial markets with frictions
(Chateauneuf et al., 1996).
Given a probability space (Ω,F , P0), the set P of probability measures in
the representation (1) corresponds to the core of the set function v = g(P0)
(Denneberg (1994a), Delbaen (2000)):
ρ(X) =
∫
∞
0
g(P0(X > t))dt = sup{EP[X] : P(A) ≤ g(P0(A)) ∀A ∈ F} (4)
Distortion principles have an economic justification in terms of Yaari’s
(1987) dual theory of choice under risk. By modifying the von Neumann-
Morgenstern independence axiom, Yaari obtains an operator H dual to ex-
pected utility, given by the superadditive Choquet integral:
H(X) =
∫
∞
0
h(P0(X > t))dx, (5)
where h : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is a continuous, increasing and convex function,
which h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1. While in expected utility theory preferences
(risk aversion) are modelled by a nonlinear transformation of a random cash-
flow, in Yaari’s framework preferences (‘uncertainty aversion’) are expressed
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by a nonlinear distortion of the cashflow’s probability distribution. The
distortion principle can then be obtained by an indifference argument.
3 Cost allocation and cooperative games
3.1 The cost functional
In our application, costs corresponding to the capital that the holder of
a risky portfolio (e.g. of insurance liabilities) is obliged to hold will be
allocated to the different instruments (or sub-portfolios) it consists of. The
cost functional used will be derived from the distortion principle defined in
the previous section.
Consider a portfolio Zu composed of n liabilities Xj , with portfolio
weights u ∈ [0, 1]n:
Zu =
∑
j
ujXj (6)
Then, as in Denault (2001), we define the cost functional c : [0, 1]n 7→ R:
c(u) = ρ(Zu) = ρ

∑
j
ujXj

 (7)
This cost functional gives the capital that the holder of portfolio Zu must
hold, as a function of the vector u of portfolio weights.
3.2 Cooperative games and the fuzzy core
In this section we give a brief and informal discussion of the application of
cooperative game theory to cost allocation problems. Consider n investors,
each holding a liability (i.e. a positive random variable) Xi and therefore
each obliged to hold (regulatory) capital ρ(Xi); in aggregate they have to
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hold
∑
j ρ(Xj). Now suppose that the investors decide to pool their liabili-
ties, i.e. to form a portfolio
∑
j Xj . The aggregate capital requirement then
becomes ρ(
∑
j Xj). Because of the subadditivity property of coherent risk
measures, it will then be ρ(
∑
j Xj) ≤
∑
j ρ(Xj). This means that the level
of aggregate capital required for the pooled liabilities Z =
∑
j Xj will be
lower than ‘the sum of its parts’.
Thus, cooperation, in the form of the pooling of liabilities, produces in
the aggregate capital savings for the investors of size
∑
j ρ(Xj)− ρ(
∑
j Xj).
Furthermore, maximal savings are produced when all investors contribute
the total of their liabilities to the pool. The question that emerges now
is how to allocate the costs (or equivalently the savings) to the different
investors, in a fair (in some sense) and efficient way. The problem of cost
allocation is thus to determine an appropriate vector d ∈ Rn such that:
∑
j
dj = c(1) = ρ(Z) = ρ(
∑
j
Xj) (8)
Cooperative game theory provides a conceptual framework for addressing
such problems. If N is the set formed by n players (e.g. portfolios), we
define an n-person cooperative game (Shapley, 1953) as an ordered pair
(c,N), where c is a real-valued function c(uS) : R
n 7→ R . The set S ∈ 2N
represents a coalition of players and the argument uS is a vector in R
n with
1 in the ith component if the ith player belongs to S and 0 otherwise. The
function c(uS) is the cost that this coalition would incur, if the players in
S would cooperate and ignore the rest of the players. In our application,
c(uS) = ρ
(∑
j∈S Xj
)
would be the amount of total capital required from a
pool containing all liabilities carried by members of S, e.g. all instruments
Xj , j ∈ S.
Consider all allocations d ∈ Rn of costs to the players that are efficient,
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that is, they add up to the aggregate cost (8). A further requirement on
the allocation scheme is that there be no coalition S with ‘blocking’ power,
that is, no coalition that would reduce its costs if it left the grand coalition
N . These considerations are formalised by the concept of the core, C, of the
game:
C = {d ∈ Rn|
∑
j∈N
dj = c(uN ) and c(uS) ≥
∑
i∈S
di ∀S ∈ 2
N} (9)
The above setting may prove inappropriate for some applications. In
the case that the players represent portfolios, it is conceivable that a player
could participate in a coalition with only part of his investment (Denault,
2001). A suitable framework for such problems is provided by the theory of
fuzzy cooperative games introduced by Aubin (1981). In a fuzzy game, each
player participates in a coalition to a certain degree; thus the coalitions are
interpreted as fuzzy sets. (This approach is closely related to the theory of
non-atomic games of Aumann and Shapley (1974), where a continuum of
players is considered and measureable sets stand for coalitions.)
An n-person fuzzy cooperative game is defined by a set of n players N
and a function: c(u) : [0, 1]n 7→ R. The vector u represents a fuzzy coalition,
by giving the ‘level of involvement’ of each player to that coalition. E.g.
ui = 0 means that player i does not contribute anything to coalition u,
ui = 1 means that he fully participates to u, and ui = 0.5 means that he
commits half of his ‘involvement in the game’ (e.g. 0.5Xi) to coalition u.
Note that the coalition of all players is now represented by the n-vector
of ones, 1. The core of an n-person fuzzy cooperative game (N, c) is then
defined as:
C = {d ∈ Rn|c(1) =
∑
i∈N
di and c(u) ≥
∑
i∈N
uidi ∀u ∈ [0, 1]
n} (10)
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It is easily understood that in the fuzzy setting, the number of coalitions
with potential blocking power increases and, accordingly, the core shrinks.
Consider the case that the cost function c is subadditive and positively
homogenous:
c(φ+ ψ) ≤ c(φ) + c(ψ)
c(γu) = γc(u) for γ ≥ 0
Then the core of the fuzzy game is convex, compact and non empty. Fur-
thermore, if c(u) is differentiable at u = 1 then the core consists only of the
gradient vector of c(u) at u = 1 (Aubin, 1981):
dCi =
∂c(u)
∂ui
|uj=1∀j (11)
This is the allocation scheme that we are going to use subsequently in the
paper. We note that Tasche (2000a) obtained a similar formula, in the
context of performance measurement.
The Aumann-Shapley value is the unique linear operator satisfying a
set of game theoretically motivated axioms (Aumann and Shapley (1974),
Aubin (1981)). The Aumann-Shapley value produces an allocation of costs:
dASi =
∂
∂ui
∫ 1
0
c(γu)dγ|uj=1∀j (12)
Besides its game theoretical derivation, the Aumann-Shapley value has been
arrived at by several authors (e.g. Billera and Heath (1982), Mirman and
Tauman (1982)) as the unique allocation scheme satisfying a set of econom-
ically motivated axioms. In the case that the cost function is subadditive,
positively homogenenous and differentiable at u = 1, it is obvious that the
Aumann-Shapley value coincides with the core of the fuzzy game (c,N):
dASi = d
C
i =
∂c(u)
∂ui
|uj=1∀j (13)
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4 The Aumann-Shapley value for distortion prin-
ciples
Explicit calculations of the Aumann-Shapley value have been given in the
bibliography for the cases that the cost functional is derived from the risk
measure Expected Shortfall (Tasche, 2000a) and a risk measure used by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Denault, 2001). Here we provide an
explicit formula for the Aumann-Shapley value in the case that the cost
functional corresponds to a distortion principle, as defined in section 2.
To derive Aumann-Shapley prices, we will need to calculate derivatives of
the type ∂c(u)
∂ui
, where c is the cost function derived from the Choquet integral
(3) as in (7). The calculation of Aumann-Shapley prices is performed by
using the quantile representation of the Choquet integral and the analytical
tool of ‘quantile derivatives’.
The cost functional c(u) equals the risk measure of the portfolio Zu =
∑
j ujXj , thus it is given by the integral:
c(u) = ρ(Zu) =
∫
Zudv, (14)
where v is the set function defined by v = g(P0), g : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is a
continuous, twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave function,
with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Let SZu be the decumulative distribution function of Z
u, SZu(z) =
P0(Z
u > z). We define the distribution function GZu : R 7→ [0, 1] of Z
u
with respect to the monotone set function v as:
GZu(z) = v(Z
u > z) = g(P0(Z
u > z)) = g ◦ SZu(z) (15)
Assume, for simplicity, that SZu(z) is a continuous one-to-one map. Its
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inverse, S−1Zu(t) then exists and is also one-to-one. The inverse of the distri-
bution function GZu(z) is defined in the obvious way:
G−1Zu(t) = S
−1
Zu ◦ g
−1(t) (16)
The Choquet integral admits a quantile representation (Denneberg, 1994a),
which yields:
c(u) =
∫
Zudv =
∫ 1
0
G−1Zu(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
S−1Zu ◦ g
−1(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
S−1Zu(t)dg(t)
(17)
In the ensuing calculations we will need to calculate
∂S−1
Zu
(t)
∂ui
. Tasche
(2000b) showed that, under some technical assumptions relating to the con-
tinuity of conditional densities (see Appendix), that we will assume to be
satisfied, such derivatives exist and are given by:
∂S−1Zu(t)
∂ui
= E[Xi|Z
u = S−1Zu(t)] (18)
Let the probability density function of Zu be fZu(z) and the joint density
of Xi and Z
u, fXi,Zu(x, z). Then we can write:
E[Xi|Z
u = z] =
∫
∞
0
x
fXi,Zu(x, z)
fZu(z)
dx (19)
We now proceed with a direct calculation of the Aumann-Shapley value.
The ith element of the Aumann-Shapley allocation dAS ∈ Rn, i.e. the
amount of capital allocated to instrument Xi, is:
dASi =
∂c(u)
∂ui
|uj=1∀j
We have:
∂c(u)
∂ui
(17)
=
∂
∂ui
∫ 1
0
S−1Zu(t)dg(t)
=
∫ 1
0
∂
∂ui
S−1Zu(t)dg(t)
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(18)
=
∫ 1
0
E[Xi|Z
u = S−1Zu(t)]dg(t)
= −
∫
∞
0
E[Xi|Z
u = z]dg(SZu(z))
(19)
= −
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
0
x
fXi,Zu(x, z)
fZu(z)
g′(SZu(z))dxdSZu(z)
=
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
0
xfXi,Zu(x, z)g
′(SZu(z))dxdz
= E[Xig
′(SZu(Z))]
Let now Z =
∑
j Xj . The Aumann-Shapley allocation will be given by:
dASi = E[Xig
′(SZu(Z
u))]|uj=1∀j = E[Xig
′(SZ(Z))] (20)
Thus, the capital allocated to the liability Xi, is calculated as its expected
value under a change of probability measure:
dASi = EQ[Xi],
∂Q
∂P0
= g′(SZ(Z)) (21)
The corresponding Radon-Nicodym derivative (or ‘price density’) thus is
D = g′(SZ(Z)). It is trivial that E[D] = 1.
Example: Consider the distortion function (e.g. Delbaen, 2000):
g(t) =
1− e−ht
1− e−h
(22)
Then
g′(t) =
he−ht
1− e−h
,
and
g′(SZ(Z)) =
he−he
SZ (Z)
1− e−h
=
ehFZ(Z)
E[ehFZ(Z)]
Thus, the Aumann-Shapley allocation using this distortion function would
be:
dASi =
E[Xie
hFZ(Z)]
E[ehFZ(Z)]
(23)
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We note the formal similarity of the above equation to the Esscher premium
principle obtained by Bu¨hlmann (1980), using exponential utility functions
in a competitive equilibrium framework. Our pricing (risk capital alloca-
tion) formula (23) is different to that of Bu¨hlmann, in that the association
of individual premium to collective risk is not induced by the aggregate risk
itself, Z, but by its order statistics, as captured by the term FZ(Z). The
fact that in our model individual premium depends only on the rank and not
the scale of aggregate losses is a direct consequence of the scale invariance
of preferences under Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice, whence the risk
measure used originates. In that sense our approach is complementary to
the one of Bu¨hlmann, as he considers competitive equilibrium pricing under
(exponential) expected utility preferences, while we obtain cooperative cost
sharing formulas under preferences expressed through (exponential) distor-
tion functions.
Remark: Consider the Choquet integral in equation (2). According to
a result due to Schmeidler (1986) (Proposition 10.1 in Denneberg (1994a)),
for every Z such that ρ(Z) < ∞, there will exist a probability measure Q
such that:
Q ≤ v and
∫
Zdv =
∫
ZdQ (24)
From the definition of the Choquet integral it immediately follows that:
Q ≤ v ⇒ EQ[X] =
∫
XdQ ≤
∫
Xdv = ρ(X), ∀X (25)
e.g. the core property is ensured if the expectation under Q is used as an
allocation mechanism. Note that this characterisation of the measure Q
does not rely on any assumptions on the continuity of distributions. On the
other hand, Q is not necessarily unique in this, more general, setting.
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5 Application: valuation of pooled liabilities
5.1 Simple model of a pool
It was shown that the Aumann-Shapley value produces a cost allocation
mechanism that takes the form of an expectation under a change of prob-
ability measure. This representation provides a formal link between cost
allocation and pricing problems. Here we make this link explicit by an ex-
ample. Consider n (re)insurers, exposed to some specific very high risks.
In order to protect themselves against these risks, they form a pool. The
pool takes on the individual insurers’ liabilities, that is, it provides rein-
surance for their individual risks. Each insurer makes cash contributions
to the pool according to his risk profile, while any claims arising from the
corresponding liabilities are paid by the pool. Similar pooling arrangements
have emerged in the case of high risks that the insurance industry faces
(for example terrorism risk), and are often set up by national governments.
Another interpretation of this pooling arrangement is in the context of an
insurance market with policyholder protection. Here the pooled risk would
represent the insurers’ liabilities in excess of the capital that each insurer
holds. The pool would then pay the insurer’s liabilities in case of insolvency.
(We will not discuss the legal implications of such arrangements here, nei-
ther will we be concerned with a scenario where the pool itself defaults.)
A third interpretation of the pooling arrangement is the case of a reinsurer
determining the premiums for the different treaties that he writes. Holding
a liability is less costly for a reinsurer with a widely diversified portfolio,
than it is for the cedent. The savings that the reinsurer derives from his
diversified portfolio can then be passed on to the buyers of the treaties in
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setting the premiums that he charges.
We assume that the amount of capital held by the pool is determined by
a risk measure such as the one used so far in the paper. Our problem now
is to calculate the contributions that the insurers have to make to the pool.
On the one hand this is cost allocation problem that can be discussed in the
terms of a (fuzzy) cooperative game. On the other, if we view the pool as
a reinsurer, the cash contributions correspond to premia that the insurers
have to pay for the liabilities ceded to the pool. The contributions represent
the price that an individual insurer pays to the collective for the protection
that he receives.
To make the example more specific, let X1, ..., Xn be positive random
variables, corresponding to the liabilities that each insurer cedes to the pool.
The pool is then exposed to risk Z =
∑
j Xj and must hold capital:
ρ (Z) =
∫
∞
0
g(SZ(z))dz
As discussed in 2, this amount can be interpreted either as the minimum
amount of economic capital required by a regulator, or as the pool’s cer-
tainty equivalent for the risk that it takes on, assuming that its preferences
are consistent with Yaari’s (1987) theory of choice under risk. In a straight-
forward application of the result in section 4, the individual insurers have
to contribute to the pool the amounts:
di = EQ[Xi] = E[Xig′(SZ(Z))]
5.2 Aumann-Shapley prices and equilibrium
A fundamental application of cooperative game theory has been to the study
of transferable utility competitive equilibria in exchange economies. In such
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applications, the characteristic (‘worth’) function of the game represents
the maximum utility that a coalition can achieve in the exchange and the
(Aumann-Shapley) value is the vector of utilities that the market partici-
pants achieve at equilibrium. In the cases of a non-atomic space of players
(Aumann-Shapley, 1974) and of fuzzy coalitions (Aubin, 1981) it has been
shown that the core of the game coincides with the set of Walras equilibria
of the economy.
Risk sharing has been examined by several authors (e.g. Borch (1962),
Bu¨hlmann (1980), Aase (2002)), in the context of competitive equilibrium
in exchange economies. These models are concerned with economies where
commodities corresponding to random cashflows are traded among a num-
ber of insurers and/or financial institutions. The cashflows can be insurance
contracts of financial securities. Market prices and consumption levels are
obtained by the maximisation of agents’ expected utilities of terminal wealth
and the imposition of a market-clearing condition. A more elaborate equi-
librium model has been proposed by Taylor (1995), who, besides stochastic
insurance liabilities and stock prices, considers consumer preferences, the
presence of real assets and the relationship between insurance pricing and
capitalisation.
A different approach was proposed by Mirman and Tauman (1982), who
proved the existence of equilibrium in a production economy with one pro-
ducer, m outputs and n consumers, when the price vector is determined by
the Aumann-Shapley value, and the consumers have quasi-concave utility
functions. Prices are dependent on demand, but no clearing condition ap-
plies. We will not use their result explicitly in this paper, but it will provide
some motivation for generalising the example of the insurance pool discussed
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earlier.
If we consider a risk market, a direct analogue of Mirman and Tauman’s
(1982) economy would be a reinsurance monopoly, with premium charged
according to Aumann-Shapley prices. Each output would correspond to a
state of the world, each consumption bundle to a random variable, and the
input to cash, used by the reinsurer in order to ‘produce’ (i.e. hold enough
capital to satisfy regulators) the random cashflows sold to the primary in-
surers.
Perhaps more realistically, we consider a generalization of the example of
the pool mentioned previously. Let again X1, · · · , Xn be the liabilities of n
primary insurance companies. However, the ith, say, insurer does not neces-
sarily purchase the precise random cashflow Xi, but buys another cashflow
Yi, again a positive random variable. The Yi’s are determined by the insur-
ers’ preferences and by the price system produced by the Aumann-Shapley
value.
Let the ith primary insurer’s preferences be expressed by an increasing
and concave utility function ui : R 7→ R. Each insurer carries initial capital
bi. The price that the insurer pays for the cashflow Yi is E [YiD], where
D is the Radon-Nikodym derivative D = g′ (SZ (Z)), SZ(z) = P0 (Z > z),
Z =
∑
j Yj . We see that the prices depend on the demand for reinsurance.
The utility of the ith insurer at the end of the time period under consideration
is:
ui (bi −Xi + Yi −E [DYi]) (26)
Equilibrium in this market will be reached when all insurers maximise
their expected utility:
max
Yi
Eui (bi −Xi + Yi − E [DYi]) ∀i (27)
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subject to budget constraints:
bi ≥ E[DYi] ∀i
Note that, due to a result by Bu¨hlmann (1980), the problem (27) is
equivalent to:
u′i (bi −Xi + Yi −E [DYi])
Eu′i (bi −Xi + Yi −E [DYi])
= D and bi ≥ E[DYi] ∀i (28)
Suppose now that all utility functions are of exponential type, ui(t) =
1
ai
(
1− eait
)
. Then (28) simplifies to:
eai(Xi−Yi)
Eeai(Xi−Yi)
= D and bi ≥ E[DYi] ∀i (29)
The above price density is the one underlying the Esscher premium principle,
derived by Bu¨hlmann (1980). In Bu¨hlmann’s model this price density, in
conjunction with a market clearing condition, yields competitive equilibrium
prices (an overview of such equilibrium models and their relationship to
the Esscher principle is provided by Gerber and Pafumi (1998)). In our
(cooperative) model no market clearing applies and the additional condition
on market prices is their consistency with the Aumann-Shapley value, i.e.
the requirement that D = g′ (SZ (Z)).
If the probability space in the problem was discrete, then the existence
of such an equilibrium would be guaranteed by Mirman and Tauman (1982).
However, since we are concerned with a continuous probability space, this
result does not necessarily hold. We will not attempt to solve this equilib-
rium problem analytically. Instead we turn our attention to a much more
simple as well as more realistic version of the problem. Instead of allowing
Yi to be any random variable with price in the i
th insurer’s budget set, we
postulate that it be an increasing function of the insurer’s original risk Xi.
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Furthermore, Yi has a specific form corresponding to a stop-loss cover with
retention Ki:
2
Yi = (Xi −Ki)+ (30)
The problem of calculating an equilibrium now becomes a question of
determining the n-vector of Ki’s by:
max
Ki
Eui(bi −min{Xi,Ki} − E[(Xi −Ki)+g
′(SZ(Z))]), (31)
such that: bi ≥ E[(Xi −Ki)+g
′(SZ(Z))] ∀i
Note that the aggregate risk to the pool, Z, now is:
Z =
∑
j
(Xj −Kj)+ (32)
There is of course no guarantee that an equilibrium exists in this modified
model (or that if it exists it is unique). We further discuss the model in the
next section through a numerical example.
Remark 1: The capital saving Wi that the i
th insurer makes by pooling
his liabilities that are in excess of Ki, equals the cost of holding this liability
in the absence of cooperation (calculated by the distortion principle), minus
the price that the insurer has to pay to the pool for the stop-loss cover:
Wi = ρ ((Xi −Ki)+)−E [D(Xi −Ki)+] (33)
2The form of this stop-loss loss cover has an interpretation in the case that we consider
an insurance market with policyholder protection. We can interpret Xi as the i
th insurer’s
liabilities, Ki as the capital that he holds and Yi as the protection he receives from the
pool, e.g. the amount that the pool pays for outstanding liabilities if i becomes insolvent,
Xi > Ki. Then the insurer i can choose the level of Ki, subject to a regulatory minimum.
Note that it is not straightforward that he would choose the lowest Ki acceptable to the
regulator, as such a choice would yield a higher premium to the pool.
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Remark 2: In the preceding discussion, we did not take into account the
regulatory capital that the insurers have to hold for their retained liabilities.
However, the inclusion of such considerations would not make a difference
in the example, apart from leading to a more stringent budget constraint.
If the ith insurer did not receive any cover from the pool, he would have
to hold regulatory capital ρ(Xi). When he receives a stop-loss cover with
retention Ki, he has to hold ρ (min{Xi,Ki}). In this case the savings from
cooperation are:
Wi = ρ(Xi)− (ρ (min{Xi,Ki}) + E [D(Xi −Ki)+])
But since the random variables min{Xi,Ki} and (Xi − Ki)+ are comono-
tonic, we have:
ρ (min{Xi,Ki}) + ρ ((Xi −Ki)+) = ρ(Xi)
and thus:
Wi = ρ ((Xi −Ki)+)− E [D(Xi −Ki)+] ,
which is the same as (33) above. The budget constraint would however
change to:
bi ≥ E[(Xi −Ki)+D] + ρ (min{Xi,Ki}) .
In the sequel we will assume that bi is net of capital requirements corre-
sponding to the retained risk. Since the exponential utility function’s risk
aversion is invariant in absolute wealth, such a change will have no affect on
the outcome.
5.3 Numerical example
We provide a simple numerical example for the model presented in 5.2.
We consider 3 insurers, each holding a lognormally distributed liability, Xi,
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ln(X) ∼ N(µ,Σ), µ = [0.9 0.9 0.9]T ,
Σ = 0.32 ·


1 0.30 0.60
0.30 1 0.80
0.60 0.80 1


Each insurer also holds cash b = 1.
The insurers’ preferences are, as previously, characterised by exponential
utility functions, and the risk aversion parameter is a = 3.5 for all insurers.
The risk measure used is a distortion principle with distortion function (22)
and parameter h = 10 (fig. 1). As discussed earlier, the economy will
be at equilibrium when the Ki’s are such that conditions (31) hold. We
assume now a market mechanism by which the retentions Ki are determined.
The Ki’s are given some reasonable initial values, e.g Ki = 3, i = 1, 2, 3
(these initial values do, as expected, affect the final outcome, though not
radically so). Every insurer chooses his retention Ki by solving the following
optimisation problem, while assuming that the other insurers’ retentions
Kj , j 6= i will remain constant:
maxKi Eui
(
bi −min{Xi,Ki} −E
[
(Xi −Ki)+g
′
(
SZ
(∑
j (Xj −Kj)+
))])
such that E
[
(Xi −Ki)+g
′
(
SZ
(∑
j (Xj −Kj)+
))]
≤ bi
(34)
When all insurers solve their optimisation problems, they announce their
preferred values of Ki, the valuation measure is thus updated, and the pro-
cess is repeated. Equilibrium is reached if and when the values of the Ki’s
stabilise. Of all vectors of Ki’s that would correspond to an equilibrium we
are interested only in those that could actually emerge through the above
negotiation process.
We simulate the process by solving the problems (34) numerically, with
21
the parameters given above. Optima are calculated via a simple search
method and objective function evaluations take place on a simulated sample
of the random vector [X1 X2 X3]
T . We observe that equilibrium is indeed
reached, after just few iterations (fig. 2). It can also be seen that although
the different insurers share the same risk profile and preferences, their final
choices of Ki’s are different:
K1 = 3.34
K2 = 3.47
K3 = 3.50
(35)
The differences can be explained by the different degrees to which individual
insurers’ ceded liabilities are correlated to the aggregate, leading to different
prices for their risks. Consider the pairwise correlations:
r
(
(X1 −K1)+,
∑
j (Xj −Kj)+
)
= 0.71
r
(
(X2 −K2)+,
∑
j (Xj −Kj)+
)
= 0.76
r
(
(X3 −K3)+,
∑
j (Xj −Kj)+
)
= 0.88
(36)
High dependence between individual and collective risk would result into
a dearer price for the risk, thus suppressing demand for reinsurance. This
explains the high retention (low coverage) that the 3rd insurer chooses, as
the correlation of his liabilities to the aggregate is highest.
Under this final choice of Ki, the individual risk of each insurer’s liability
ceded to the pool (calculated by the distortion principle) is:
ρ((X1 −K1)+) = 0.67
ρ((X2 −K2)+) = 0.57
ρ((X3 −K3)+) = 0.56
(37)
The above quantities correspond to the cost of holding the liabilities (Xi −
Ki)+, in the absence of cooperation. The premium allocated to each insurer
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is:
d1 = E[(X1 −K1)+g
′(SZ(Z)] = 0.55
d2 = E[(X2 −K2)+g
′(SZ(Z)] = 0.47
d3 = E[(X3 −K3)+g
′(SZ(Z)] = 0.52
∑
j dj = E[Zg
′(SZ(Z)] = ρ(Z) = 1.54
(38)
The development of individual risks and allocated capital for the different
insurers up to equilibrium is shown in figure 3. The difference between the
two lines corresponds to the savings that each insurer makes by cooper-
ating with the others. It is seen that the highest saving is made by the
first insurer, whose liability is less correlated to the aggregate and whose
participation in the pool is highest, while the lowest saving is made by the
third insurer, whose liability has the highest correlation to the aggregate
and whose participation in the pool is lowest.
6 Summary and future research
We discuss the problem of allocating capital requirements for a portfolio of
stochastic liabilities to the different instruments (and sub-portfolios) that
the portfolio consists of. The allocation functional used is the Aumann-
Shapley value from cooperative game theory, which has been proposed as a
cost allocation mechanism by several authors (Mirman and Tauman (1982),
Billera and Heath (1982), Denault (2001)). In our application, we used
as a risk measure the distortion principle, which is an actuarial premium
calculation principle satisfying the coherence axioms of Artzner et al. (1999).
The resulting allocation of costs is the unique element of the core of the
associated cooperative game, in the sense that it is the unique allocation
that does not produce a disincentive for cooperation to (the holder of) any
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instrument or sub-portfolio.
For our choice of risk measure we obtained an explicit formula for the
Aumann-Shapley value. Capital requirements are calculated for each sub-
portfolio as its expected value under a change of probability measure. From
the resulting formula it can be seen that the amount of capital allocated
to each sub-portfolio is closely related to the dependence structure between
itself and the aggregate portfolio. Tail dependence between individual and
aggregate risk tends to increase capital requirements, while in the extreme
case of comonotonicity any savings from pooling vanish.
In the final section we utilise the representation of allocated capital as
an expectation under an adjusted probability measure, in order to draw
a parallel between capital allocation and insurance pricing problems. We
consider the case of a pool, which reinsures the excess liabilities of a num-
ber of insurers, and charges risk premium according to Aumann-Shapley
prices. Such a pooling arrangement is conceivable for protection against
high industry-wide risks (e.g. terrorism) or in the case of an insurance mar-
ket with policyholder protection. Motivated by an equilibrium model of
Mirman and Tauman (1982) we generalise the model of the pool by let-
ting the insurers decide themselves about the level of coverage that they
receive from the pool, via expected utility maximisation. We finally present
a numerical example, which illustrates the ideas previously discussed.
The main analytical result obtained in the paper, the formula for the
Aumann-Shapley value, was derived under the assumption that conditional
probability densities are continuous. Further research is required for the
discontinuous case, in which the cost function will not be differentiable with
respect to portfolio weights. The core of the related cooperative game will
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be the subdifferential of the cost function (Aubin, 1981) and will contain
multiple allocations. It would be interesting to know whether the solution
that we obtained under the continuity assumption will be one of them.
Another topic for future research is the generalisation of the methodol-
ogy developed here to a dynamic setting. Prerequisite for an intertemporal
allocation method is the dynamic generalisation of the risk measure used.
Updating rules for submodular set functions and distorted probabilities have
been studied by Denneberg (1994b), Young (1998), Wang and Young (1998),
while attempts to generalise conditional expectation to the non-additive case
can be found in Denneberg (2000) and Lehrer (1996).
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A Quantile derivatives
This section follows Tasche (2000b). Let X be a real valued random variable.
For a ∈ (0, 1) the a-quantile of X, Qa(X) is defined as:
Qa(X) = inf{x ∈ R|P0(X ≤ x) ≥ a}
Now let
Zu =
∑
j
ujXj
be a portfolio consisting of random liabilities Xj , j = 1, 2, ..., n. We are
interested in derivatives of the a-quantile of Zu, with respect to the portfolio
weights uj , i.e. in expressions of the form:
∂Qa(Z
u)
∂ui
Such ‘quantile derivatives’ exist, subject to a set of technical assump-
tions. Let n ≥ 2 and (X1, ..., Xn) be an R
n-valued vector with a conditional
density φ of X1 given (X2, ..., Xn). φ satisfies the assumptions in an open
set U ⊂ R \ {0} × Rd−1 if:
(i) For fixed x2, ..., xn, the function t 7→ φ(t, x2, ..., xn) is continuous in t.
(ii) The mapping
(t, u) 7→ E[φ(u−11 (t−
n∑
j=2
ujXj), X2, ..., Xn)],
R× U 7→ [0,∞)
is finite-valued and continuous.
(iii) For each i = 2, ..., n the mapping
(t, u) 7→ E[Xiφ(u
−1
1 (t−
n∑
j=2
ujXj), X2, ..., Xn)],
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R× U 7→ R
is finite-valued and continuous.
If φ satisfies the above assumptions in some open set U ⊂ R
{0} × Rd−1, the quantile derivative exists and is given by:
∂Qa(Z
u)
∂ui
= E[Xi|
∑
j
ujXj = Qa(Z
u)]
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Figure 1: Distortion function g(t) = 1−e
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, h=10.
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Figure 2: Development of retentions K until equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 3: Risk of individual insurers’ ceded liabilities and allocated capital.
The difference between the lines represents savings from cooperation.
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